Abstract: Given the ever increasing number of Wi-Fi devices in use by the public, the progressing urbanisation, and the current attempts by the industry to improve Wi-Fi system performance, we here analyse the case of apartment blocks with residents increasingly suffering from Wi-Fi over-congestion. Here, individuals use private Wi-Fi networks in an ''in house'' environment to achieve cordless connectivity to the Internet. We show that Wi-Fi in apartment blocks is a true commons and, therefore, over-congestion can only be avoided by having the individual access point (AP) operators collaborating with each other. We found that such collaboration is not inhibited by current regulation, but neither can it be enforced. However, as AP operators will most likely enter collaboration voluntarily, further regulation is not deemed necessary.
Introduction
Over the last decade, the use of portable devices has spectacularly increased. Wi-Fi connectivity has proven to be a primary asset of these devices. The Wi-Fi Alliance estimates that more than 8 billion Wi-Fi devices are currently in use around the world (Wi-Fi Alliance, Service Provider. In the following section we describe the problem at hand in economic as well as technical terms. We then show that, from an economic perspective, we are dealing with a typical example of the Tragedy of the Commons. As a consequence, a solution can only be formulated in terms of some form of coordination among the APs' operators. We first give a simple example of how this could work in practice, and then postulate a generic business model for the more complex cases. We then treat the regulatory aspects of this business model in more depth, especially from the perspective of European and Australian spectrum access and antitrust laws.
Congestion of Class Licence spectrum Spectrum commons
Much literature has been written on the question if spectrum for wireless communication is a common or a public good, or even a private good or a club good. Currently, most of the radio spectrum is managed and regulated by governments in a command-and-control fashion, i.e. spectrum is treated as a public good. A brief history on how this has evolved over the decades is provided by Peter Anker (Anker, 2017) . In practice this means that national regulators are the centralised authorities for spectrum allocation and usage decisions. The usage is often set to be exclusive: each band is licensed to a single provider, thus maintaining interference-free communication. To enable international business and operation, national governments try, not always successfully, to standardise their policies in the ITU-R (International Telecommunication Union -Radiocommunications sector). In Australia, spectrum is regulated by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). The Australian Government and ACMA follow the recommendations of the ITU as far as practical but not necessarily exclusively.
For the first time in 1947, the ITU-R set aside a number of frequency bands for the use of industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) purposes other than telecommunications. This allows devices that use RF for the purpose of heating (e.g. microwave ovens), medical diagnostics, etc. to "leak" radio waves as long as specified limits on transmit power are not exceeded.
technology. In the US, this type of use is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 47, Part 15 (GPO, 2016) , and is called "unlicensed". As a consequence, the frequency bands used by these devices became popularly known as "unlicensed spectrum". In contrast to the original use of the ISM band, the unlicensed spectrum is a commons which every communication device operator can use at its own discretion, whilst having to accept the interference caused by other devices. The regulatory and economic aspects of these commons have been discussed and analysed by many authors already, also in this journal, especially in the context of public Wi-Fi deployment (De Vries et al, 2013; Weiser & Hatfield, 2005; Speta, 2008; Reed & Lansford, 2013; Potts, 2014; Goggin, 2014; Lambert et al, 2014) .
Interestingly though, when discussing public Wi-Fi, Jason Potts (Potts, 2014) concludes that Wi-Fi is not a commons but a club good (Buchanan, 1965) , as it is excludable (access can be denied) and non-rivalrous (access by one does not exclude access by others). The latter, though, is a consequence of the fact that the roll-out of public Wi-Fi by competing instances is his Wi-Fi, it will have a negative effect on the performance of the network of resident B due to interference and congestion).
Wi-Fi
Today, IEEE 802.11-2016 (IEEE 802.11, 2016 only. Depending on the nationally specified width of the ISM band, these standards divide the band into 11-14 heavily overlapping channels. Every .11b or .11g WLAN is working on one of these channels, which is manually configured or auto-configured by a frequency selection algorithm in the AP. Only 3 channels can be chosen such that they do not overlap, e.g. channel 1, 6, and 11, or 1, 7, and 14.
The newer extensions of the standard, .11n and .11ac, also specify operation in the so-called An important property of commons is that if access to it is unlimited, it may lead to the socalled Tragedy of the Commons (Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1968) . This is a situation within a shared-resource system where individual users acting independently according to their own self-interest behave contrary to the common good of all users by depleting or spoiling that resource through their collective action. As an apartment block is typically inhabited by a limited number of users, this situation does not seem to apply. However, the amount of devices that each user is operating at any given time is virtually unlimited, and if these devices interfere with each other, the Tragedy will take effect: all devices will operate at their maximum transmit power level in order to achieve an acceptable performance, and as such, ruin the media for each other.
example of the Tragedy. Adding APs to an apartment block does not per se reduce the overall Wi-Fi system capacity. As explained before, it rather just redistributes the available capacity over the operating APs and devices. In many cases it even enlarges the total available capacity slightly, as not every AP will be interfering equally as much everywhere in the apartment block.
Certainly, if resident A has two APs, and resident B has only one, resident A may enjoy twice the capacity of resident B, causing resident B to buy his own additional AP. But that in itself does not deplete the commonly available resource.
But then, in 2013, Ozyagci, Sung and Zander (Ozyagci et al, 2013) showed that a system consisting of a continuously increasing number of Wi-Fi APs in an indoor environment will ultimately end up in an over-congested state. The difference between mere congestion and over-congestion is schematically depicted in Figure 2 , which we copied from Ozyagci et al's
article. A Wi-Fi system in an over-congested state uses an increasingly larger portion of the total available capacity for control traffic generated by the MAC protocol trying to mitigate the traffic congestion and packet collisions. The end result is actual depletion of the common resource. We therefore conclude that the Tragedy of the Commons does not apply to Wi-Fi congestion, but it does to Wi-Fi over-congestion.
Although Wi-Fi over-congestion is less common than Wi-Fi congestion, we recently showed that even if residents have only one AP and a few devices in operation per apartment, the system can be in a state of over-congestion at peak times, if the frequency planning is done badly (Den Hartog, Popescu et al, 2016) . The conclusion for the short term is evident:
operators and users should immediately stop trying to solve their Wi-Fi performance problems in densely populated areas by just adding APs and repeaters. 
Introducing the Spectrum Usage Broker and the Wi-5 System Operator
In the case of an apartment block, there may be more than a hundred residents, who do not necessarily know each other or have good relationships with each other. They may not be technically knowledgeable enough to be able to configure their AP. And apart from frequency channel, there are various other parameters that could be tuned in order to optimise the use of the spectrum, including transmit power and the ability to hand over devices to other, more suitable APs (horizontal handover) or even to a mobile network (vertical handover, reverse off-loading). Including these parameters as variables makes the process of consensus formation and the actual execution of the policy a task too complex to achieve without professional and automated assistance.
In the Wi-5 project we therefore introduced a generic business model with two new actors or business roles (Den Hartog, Kempker et al, 2016) . They are the Spectrum Usage Broker and the Wi-5 System Operator. The Spectrum Usage Broker devises and maintains sensible spectrum sharing strategies between AP operators in a cooperative context. This may include a pricing agreement. The Wi-5 System Operator is in charge of operating a technology platform needed to automate the execution of the spectrum sharing strategies as devised by the Spectrum Usage Broker. An architecture of such platform is provided in the Wi-5 project deliverable D2.4 (Bouhafs, 2015) .
In the use case of the dense apartment block, the new business roles could be implemented as
follows. An apartment block has many other commons available to the tenants: hallway, joint garden, parking lot, etc. (depending on the details of the arrangement they may be club goods, but this does not alter our line of reasoning). Spectrum can be dealt with just as the other commons: tenants make mutual agreements about its use, and a caretaker has to execute the agreements. The making of the mutual agreements can be facilitated by the Owners'
Corporations or the building's Body Corporate, which is often an official entity, and tenants already pay a mandatory yearly subscription fee to their Corporation. The Corporation thus fulfils the role of Spectrum Usage Broker, and tries, within the bounds of regulation, to broker fair shares of the spectrum for every Local AP Manager. It may be aided in this task by a Code of Practice to be developed by, for instance, the Australian telecommunications self-regulatory body Communications Alliance.
After the Spectrum Usage Broker successfully matches the offer and demand of spectrum / capacity in the apartment block, the resulting policy is then handed to the Wi-5 System Operator, i.e. an entity that can control the individual APs. This could be an independent subcontractor, e.g. an IT company specialised in running a Wi-5-type platform, possibly "as a service" from the cloud. It could also be one of the broadband access providers servicing the apartments. Many access providers already have the knowledge and technology in place to take up such an additional role.
Regulation Spectrum access
As said before, the use of, or access to, Class Licence spectrum for communication services is 2. The use of the spectrum is not subject to individual rights; the spectrum is made available on a non-exclusive basis.
Stated differently, everybody has the fundamental right to access the spectrum anytime and
anywhere, but has to accept possible interference from other users. This means that, in our use case of the apartment block, entrants such as new residents cannot be forced to participate in the collaboration, as this would equate to making the spectrum excludable, i.e. turning it into a club good where the Owners' Corporation is the club. This means that entrants should be enticed rather than forced to participate in the collaboration scheme. While assuming that all players act rationally, this will be achieved if joining the collaboration leads to lower operational costs and/or better network performance for all players involved. Said otherwise,
